One of Leibniz’s basic claims is that every true proposition entails an \textit{a priori} connection between the subject and the predicate. Historically speaking, this position is unusual in that Leibniz thinks that this connection holds not only in necessary propositions such as ‘all triangles have three sides,’ but in contingent ones as well, e.g. ‘Adam who sins exists.’ This theory suggests an important problem that runs throughout Leibniz’s philosophy, namely the problem of freedom. If sinning has an \textit{a priori} relationship to Adam’s existence, then Adam is not free not to sin. However, Leibniz thinks that he can solve this problem. Famously, in the \textit{Theodicy} Leibniz characterizes freedom in the following way. “Freedom, such as is required by the schools of theology, consist in \textit{intelligence}, which includes a distinct knowledge of the object of deliberation; in \textit{spontaneity}, in virtue of which we determine ourselves; and in \textit{contingency}, that is, in the exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity” (G 6:288). Most generally, Leibniz’s solution to the problem of freedom is in fact the complex mixture of intelligence, spontaneity and contingency. In the last decade or so, we have seen a disproportionate emphasis on the importance of spontaneity. On the other hand, in this paper I would like to focus on contingency and intelligence.
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